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Introduction 
 
In 2015, $373.25 billion was donated in the United States (Dale & Colinvaux, 2015; Giving USA 
Foundation, 2016). Fifty-nine percent of the general population reports donating to charity (2013 
Philanthropy Panel Study on giving in 2012 as cited in (Osili, Clark, St Claire, & Bergdoll, 
2016). Recent policy debates have focused on how changes in tax policy could affect charitable 
giving. The charitable deduction was first built into the US tax code in 1917 to provide 
incentives for giving given increased wartime tax rates (Galle, Colinvaux, & Steuerle, 2012). In 
addition, there was a fear that by taxing high-income people, those people would stop (or reduce) 
their giving. The charitable deduction was intended to provide an incentive to give in the face of 
new taxes on income. After the income tax reached an unprecedented three-quarters of the U.S. 
populace in 1944 (Muthitacharoen & Giertz, 2011), the IRS introduced the standard deduction. 
The standard deduction provided benefits for some taxpayers who became eligible for a larger 
deduction than could be achieved through itemized expenses in addition to reduced 
administrative costs for the IRS. As of 2014, approximately 30 percent of households still choose 
to itemize (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2017b).  
 
Changes in tax policies are expected to have direct and indirect effects on a wide array of 
individual and household economic decisions, including charitable donations. As the White 
House and Congress consider new tax policies to stimulate economic growth, there has been 
significant debate about the potential impact of the proposed tax changes on charitable giving. 
An important question is whether changes in tax policy could encourage more people—
specifically, non-itemizers—to give more. 
 
On April 26, 2017, the White House unveiled a preliminary outline of their tax reform plan 
(White House Proposal; Trump, 2017). Legislation is still being crafted that combines the White 
House proposal with the tax plan proposed by Republicans in the House of Representatives. 
While further announcements are likely forthcoming to update the House tax plan, the most 
recent announced proposal from the House was the Tax Reform Blueprint proposed by House 
Speaker Paul Ryan and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady on June 24, 
2016 (House Tax Reform Blueprint; Brady & Ryan, 2016). 
 
The goal of this study is to provide estimates of the potential effects of tax policy changes 
proposed in the 2014 Tax Reform Act by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave 
Camp (R-MI) and changes proposed by the White House on charitable giving. The differences 
between the Camp Proposal, the White House Proposal, and the House Tax Reform Blueprint are 
negligible (see Table 1). Therefore, this study uses the Camp Proposal in its analyses, which has 
two benefits: 1) the Camp Proposal was an actual bill and is not subject to further changes that 
are likely to occur with both the White House and House proposals and 2) the Camp Proposal 
proposed smaller changes from the current law than the White House and House proposals. 
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Table 1. Comparison of current law, the Camp Proposal, the White House proposal, and the 
House Tax Reform Blueprint 
 Current Law 
(2016) 
Camp Proposal White House 
Proposal 
House Tax 
Reform 
Blueprint 
Standard 
Deduction 
$6,300 
(individuals); 
$12,600 (joint 
filers) 
$11,000 
(individuals); 
$22,000 (joint 
filers) 
$12,600 
(individuals); 
$24,000 (joint 
filers) 
$12,000 
(individuals); 
$24,000 (joint 
filers) 
Tax Brackets 10%, 15%, 
25%, 28%, 
33%, 35%, 
39.6% 
10%, 25%, 35% 10%, 25%, 35% 0%/12%, 25%, 
33% 
Charitable 
deduction 
Itemizers only Itemizers only Itemizers only Itemizers only 
 
Using data from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
including the Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS) created by the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
(LFSOP), and the 2009 IRS Statistics of Income Public Use File (SOI PUF)1, this report will 
answer the following questions: 
1. What are the estimated effects of proposed tax policy changes on charitable giving? 
2. What is the effect on charitable giving in tax reform if the charitable tax deduction is 
expanded to non-itemizers, in addition to itemizers? 
3. How do the proposed tax policy changes affect taxpayers’ charitable giving across 
income levels and by charitable subsector (religious versus non-religious)? 
4. What are the effects of these policy changes on tax revenue collected by the U.S. 
Treasury? 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This study used the Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS), which is the only panel study of 
philanthropy in America, and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is 
the largest and longest running panel study in the world. The PSID has a rich array of data for 
over 9,000 households, including, income, wealth, marital status, existence and number of 
children, etc. We know from prior research that these variables play an important role in 
explaining and predicting giving patterns, and they are not all available in other datasets used for 
this type of research. Using this data, Indiana University’s estimates suggest that it is important 
to consider where tax payers are responsive to changes in charitable giving incentives. However, 
because there is still significant debate with regards to the responsiveness of charitable giving to 
changes in tax policy (see pages 11-15 for a discussion on tax-price elasticity of charitable 
giving), analyses of each proposal were also conducted using the commonly used elasticities: 
less responsive, -0.5 & moderately responsive, -1.0. 
 
This study examined the effects of proposed policy changes on charitable contributions and 
government tax revenue. The policy scenarios included in this study examined various 
                                                          
1 2009 is the most recent available IRS Statistics of Income Public Use File. 
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combinations of three major policy changes: (1) increasing the value of the standard deduction to 
$11,000 for individuals and $22,000 for married couples, (2) extending the charitable tax 
deduction to non-itemizers, and (3) decreasing the highest marginal tax rate to 35 percent. Key 
findings include: 
1. The current proposals, which include an increase in the standard deduction and a decrease 
in the top marginal tax rate, would have a negative effect on charitable giving with giving 
decreasing between $4.9 and $13.1 billion (-1.7 percent to -4.6 percent). 
2. Expanding the charitable deduction to non-itemizers, as a stand-alone provision, 
increases total giving by between 1.3 percent and 4.3 percent and has a negligible effect 
on total tax revenue (decrease by 0.41 percent to 0.47 percent). 
3. Combined with current tax reform proposals, expanding the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers more than offsets the charitable giving lost by other tax reform proposals and 
increases giving by 0.4 percent to 1.7 percent. Increasing the standard deduction has a 
negative effect on charitable giving for both religious congregations and other charities 
but a larger negative effect on giving to congregations than on giving to other charities. 
4. All policies proposed have a negative effect on federal tax revenue: expanding the 
charitable deduction to non-itemizers alone has the smallest effect on tax revenue 
decreasing revenue by .4 percent to .5 percent and all three proposals combined have the 
largest effect on tax revenue decreasing revenue by an estimated 3.8 percent. 
 
It is important to note that studies examining proposed policy changes must make important 
assumptions regarding tax-price elasticity, or the responsiveness of charitable giving to changes 
in tax policy. Previous research on expanding the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has 
found slightly lower increases in charitable giving with slightly smaller decreases in tax revenue 
than those found for itemizers. This difference is primarily due to the use of less responsive 
elasticities. Using the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model, Rosenberg, 
Steuerle, Ovalle, and Stallworth (2016) estimated that expanding the charitable deduction to all 
tax payers would increase charitable contributions by $5.0 billion (elasticity = -0.5) to $10.2 
billion (elasticity = -1.0) while simultaneously decreasing tax revenue by $9.2 billion in 2017. 
This study extends the findings of Rosenberg et al. (2016) by using income dependent 
elasticities. Using the Open Source Policy Center’s (OSPC) tax-calculator microsimulation, this 
study found that charitable contributions would be expected to increase by approximately $12.2 
billion with a simultaneous decrease in tax revenue of $13.1 billion when highly responsive 
elasticities were used. In addition, when the standard elasticities (-0.5 and -1.0) are used in 
conjunction with the OSPC’s tax-calculator microsimulations, this study found that charitable 
contributions would be expected to increase by $3.8 billion (elasticity = -0.5) to $7.5 billion 
(elasticity = -1.0) while simultaneously decreasing tax revenue by $11.6 billion (elasticity = -0.5) 
to $12.4 billion (elasticity = -1.0). 
 
This study further expands upon the study conducted by Rosenberg et al. (2016) by examining 
the expansion of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers as an addition to the current proposals 
(increase in the standard deduction and decrease in the top marginal tax rate). Regardless of 
which elasticity is used, adding a non-itemizer charitable deduction to the current tax reform 
proposals would more than offset the amount of charitable giving that would otherwise be lost 
under the current proposals resulting in a $1.1 billion to $4.8 billion increase in total giving 
overall. 
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Background 
 
Nearly 100 years ago, the U.S. introduced the charitable deduction. In 2015, nearly $217 billion 
were contributed to charity by itemizing households, an increase of 4.1 percent from 2014 
(Giving USA Foundation, 2016). Federal tax policies have a significant effect on charitable 
giving. As taxpayers file their tax returns, they have a choice whether to itemize deductions, 
including charitable giving, or take the standard deduction. Certain personal expenses such as 
tuition or IRA contributions can be subtracted from a person’s total income to determine the 
person’s adjusted gross income (AGI; Frankel, 2017). These deductions, called “above-the-line” 
deductions, are available to all filers regardless of itemization status. From 1982 to 1986, 
charitable contributions were considered above-the-line contributions in U.S. tax policy 
(Duquette, 1999). Currently, taxpayers only claim itemized deductions (including the charitable 
deduction) if the sum of their itemized deductions is greater than the standard deduction. 
 
Certain deductions are only allowed if the aggregate of those deductions exceeds two percent of 
the person’s AGI. However, charitable deductions are not subject to this minimum, called a 
“particularized floor” (United States Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Code, 1933). The charitable 
deduction is subject to a maximum value for deductions. Generally, taxpayers cannot deduct 
more than 50 percent of their AGI in charitable contributions. More restrictive limits of 20 
percent and 30 percent apply to specific types of charitable contributions (e.g. contributions of 
capital gain property is subject to the 20 percent limit; contributions to veterans’ organizations, 
fraternal societies, nonprofit cemeteries, etc. are subject to the 30 percent limit; (United States 
Internal Revenue Service, 2017b). For high-income households ($259,400 for individuals and 
$311,300 for joint filers), the Pease limitation imposes an overall limit to most itemized 
deductions, including charitable deductions. If a filer is subject to the limit, the total of all of 
their itemized deductions is reduced either by 3 percent of their AGI over the threshold or to 80 
percent of their itemized deductions, whichever is smaller (Ackerman & Auten, 2006; Lu, 2017). 
In an example provided by the IRS, a couple filing a joint return has an adjusted gross income of 
$325,500 and itemized deductions totaling $142,140. The couple’s AGI is $14,200 over the limit 
($325,500 - $311,300). Therefore, they must subtract three percent of this difference (three 
percent of $14,200 = $426) from their total itemized deduction and the couple can only deduct 
$141,714 (United States Internal Revenue Service, 2017a). 
 
Both the percentage of all taxpayers who itemize deductions (ranging from 36 percent in 2005 to 
30 percent in 2014) and the share of itemizers reporting charitable contributions (91 percent in 
1988 to 82 percent in 2014) vary slightly over the years (Lu, 2017).  
 
However, certain patterns have been maintained over time.  
1. High-income taxpayers are much more likely to itemize. For example, in 2014, 92 
percent of those taxpayers reporting AGI above $500,000 itemized deductions, while 49 
percent reporting AGI of $50,000-99,000 itemized—and only 7 percent reporting AGI 
under $30,000 itemized (Lu, 2017). 
2. Itemizers are also far more likely to donate: PSID data reveal that 83 percent of itemizers 
reported donating any amount of charitable giving at all, compared to 44 percent of non-
itemizers. In fact, non-itemizers contribute less than 20 percent of total giving (Rosenberg 
et al., 2016). 
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Policymakers have shown a growing interest in determining how changing the structure of the 
charitable deduction could encourage more people—specifically, non-itemizers—to give and 
give more. 
 
Key issues that have dominated the policy discussion over the past century: the desire to 
maximize private donations without reducing taxpayer revenue (“tax efficiency” or “Treasury 
efficiency” (Ackerman & Auten, 2006) and simultaneously reducing the administrative burden 
of confronting fraud in enforcing an increasingly complex system (Rosenberg et al., 2016). The 
charitable deduction is expected to cost the Treasury $51.2 billion in fiscal year 2018. However, 
it is still one of the “cheaper” tax expenditures: ten tax expenditures cost the Treasury more than 
the charitable deduction with the most expensive – exclusion of employer contributions for 
medical insurance premiums and medical care – costing over $235 billion in FY2018 (Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2017c).  
 
As tax policy changes take place, efficiency is not the only issue to be taken into account; 
determining the impact of changes in the charitable deduction on tax payers’ equity is also 
important. The charitable deduction itself may be seen as a prioritization of charitable 
taxpayers—as the deduction has implications for tax revenue, the tax code compensates with a 
higher marginal income tax rate for taxpayers overall, if one assumes a balanced budget 
approach (Bakija, 2000). While favoring those policies that encourage high-income taxpayers to 
donate may result in the largest increase in charitable giving (Galle et al., 2012), any policy that 
incentivizes one type of taxpayer to itemize or donate more so than another shifts U.S. donations 
to that taxpayer’s preferences. In other words, these tax policy changes may result in a change in 
the type of charities to which donations are made. For example, it has been noted that wealthy 
households give smaller proportions of their overall donations to support religious organizations 
or basic needs nonprofits and more to arts and education compared to other donors (Galle et al., 
2012). 
 
Before considering possible policy options that would modify the charitable deduction, research 
must first assess the efficacy of the current approach. The literature reveals two perspectives on 
the charitable deduction: income-adjustment (i.e. income effects) or subsidy payment (i.e., 
substitution or price effects; (Dale & Colinvaux, 2015; Galle et al., 2012). In the first 
perspective, the charitable deduction may be considered an adjustment to the taxpayer’s bill. 
Because the tax burden is lower, taxpayers give more. In other words, charitable donations have 
reduced the taxpayer’s ability to make personal consumption decisions (Galle et al., 2012). The 
second, and more popular, perspective, recognizes that charitable donations are personal 
consumption decisions made by taxpayers. In this view, the charitable deduction is a subsidy or 
incentive that the U.S. government grants taxpayers to promote philanthropy (Dale & Colinvaux, 
2015). Because the cost of additional giving is less, taxpayers give more. Yet, in both models, 
taxpayers’ private philanthropy is being used to fund various “public goods” either as a 
complement or a substitute to direct government funding. In other words, if taxpayers’ donations 
are used as a complement to government funding, the level of government funding would remain 
constant regardless of the amount donated. However, if taxpayers’ donations are used to 
substitute government funding, the government would reduce their funding as donations 
increase. In practice, neither model works perfectly; what actually occurs is more complicated. 
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The theory can inform policymakers’ preferences when developing or supporting future 
proposals. Depending on which model policymakers favor (income-adjusted, subsidy payment, 
or a combination), they will be likely to favor different types of proposals (Dale & Colinvaux, 
2015). These polices may include increasing the standard deduction, adding tax credits or caps, 
or changing the types of deductions allowed. These proposals might suggest only accepting 
deductions above a certain percent-of-AGI floor. 
 
 
 
Box 1. Key Concept: Tax-Price Elasticity 
 
The degree to which donations change in response to changes in tax policy. 
 
Calculating the price of giving: 
For itemizers, the after-tax cost or price of giving a $1 donation is estimated as one minus the 
taxpayer’s maximum marginal tax rate (MTR). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 $1 = 1 −𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
Example (marginal tax rate = 25%): 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 $1 = 1 −  .25 = $0.75 
 
Calculating the tax-price elasticity:  
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = % 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸% 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 
 
Example: If a non-itemizer would normally donate $100, what is the expected donation if the 
taxfiler were to switch from non-itemization to itemization status with a marginal tax rate of 
25% holding all other assumptions constant? 
% Change in price of giving = -25% 
 
Elasticity Donation if non-
itemizer  
(tax-price = 1) 
Donation if itemizer 
with MTR = 25%  
(tax-price = $0.75) 
Change in 
Charitable 
Giving 
% Change in 
donations 
-1* $100 $125 ↑ $25 25% 
-0.5 $100 $112.50 ↑ $12.5 12.5% 
0** $100 $100 ↑↓ $0 0% 
1 $100 $75 ↓ $25 -25% 
-1.44*** $100 $136 ↑ $36 36% 
 
An absolute value price elasticity over 1 suggests that the amount donated surpasses that 
amount lost in taxpayer revenue (Duquette, 1999). 
 
* In this case (elasticity = -1), the amount of tax revenue lost is directly and equally offset by the additional 
amount of charitable giving (Dale & Colinvaux, 2015; Galle, et. al., 2012). 
 
** A price elasticity of 0 would indicate that the tax deductibility had no impact on the amount given to charity 
(Bakija, 2000). 
 
*** The average tax-price elasticity of demand for charitable giving is -1.4 (Peloza & Steel, 2005).  
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Theory predicts that in deciding how much to donate, taxpayers will respond to the after-tax 
price (or cost) of giving. The degree to which donations change in response to changes in policy 
is the tax-price elasticity of giving (see Box 1).  
 
There is still significant debate among scholars as to the best method to estimate tax price 
elasticity of giving, which in turn leads to a wide range in estimations of this elasticity. The 
general price elasticity of donations may vary between -.5 and -1.75 (Ackerman & Auten, 2006; 
Auten, Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002; Dale & Colinvaux, 2015; Feldstein & Lindsey, 1983; Randolph, 
1995). However, results of previous studies are highly dependent of the type of analysis 
conducted, the timeframe of analysis (short-run vs. long-run), and the nature of the datasets. For 
example, studies using panel data analysis show a lower price elasticity for charitable donations. 
(Barrett, McGuirk, & Steinberg, 1997; Broman, 1989; Duquette, 1999; Randolph, 1995; Ricketts 
& Westfall, 1993). Moreover, studies that rely on survey data show higher elasticity than studies 
using IRS tax-filer data. However, it is worth noting that a majority of the previous literature rely 
on tax-filer data rather than survey data (Peloza & Steel, 2005). In addition, few studies 
specifically examine price elasticity associated with non-itemizer donations (Duquette, 1999), 
because these data are not available from IRS tax filers for non-itemizers.  
 Table 2: Sample tax-price elasticity of giving* 
Citation Estimated elasticity 
Randolph (1995) Permanent: -0.51 
Transitory: -1.55 
Auten et al. (2002) Persistent: -0.79 to -1.26 
Transitory: -0.40 to -0.52 
Barrett et al. (1997) Long-run: -0.47 
Bakija and Heim (2011) -0.7 
Peloza and Steel (2005), 
meta-analysis 
-1.4 (range +0.6 to -7.07)** 
Clotfelter (1985) -1.1 to -1.3 
*This is not a comprehensive list, but instead highlights tax-price elasticities found by studies 
that grapple with the major issues discussed regarding the difficulty in calculating tax-price 
elasticity of giving. 
**Large standard deviation = 1.21 
 
There is much debate as to what empirical approach should be used to calculate elasticities. One 
method is to use a fixed-effects model (one-way or two-way). This model assumes that there are 
individual and/or year specific variables that influence a household’s giving (Barrett et al., 1997). 
Random-effects model is another method used in this literature. A random-effects model 
assumes that individual and/or year effects are not specific to an individual and/or year within 
the sample, but are drawn from various effects found in the population (Barrett et al., 1997). 
Barrett et al. (1997) found that fixed-effects models produced more robust consistency among 
estimated elasticities. 
 
Another variable that needs to be considered when calculating the tax-price elasticity of giving is 
whether to measure short-run elasticity or long-run elasticity (measuring transitory income and 
tax price or permanent income and tax price respectively). Both income and tax price vary over 
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time and may differ significantly in measures of short-run elasticity when compared to measures 
of long-run elasticity. Studies that do not account for this difference may be conflating the short-
run elasticity with the long-run elasticity (Bakija, 2000). People are willing to substitute 
charitable donations between years to take advantage of current and future tax policies that may 
result in a higher tax price of their donation. Randolph (1995) argued that this tendency to react 
to current tax policy has caused existing elasticity estimates to overestimate the effects of 
permanent price changes and transitory income and to underestimate the effects of transitory 
price changes and permanent income. In other words, giving is less sensitive to permanent price 
changes and more sensitive to transitory price changes than previously thought. Giving is also 
more sensitive to permanent income and less sensitive to transitory income than previously 
thought (Randolph, 1995). However, this issue is not settled and there is still debate among 
scholars as to the effects of permanent and transitory income and price changes. In contrast to the 
findings by Randolph (1995), Auten et al. (2002) found that giving is more sensitive to 
permanent price changes and less sensitive to transitory price changes and less sensitive to 
permanent income and more sensitive to transitory income. These differing findings typically 
result in the different methods used to measure income and tax prices. Many studies (including 
(Randolph, 1995), use an average or two or more years as a measure of income and tax-price, 
others use first-dollar tax-price and first-dollar tax liability to measure the price of giving and 
income (Barrett et al., 1997), and some, such as Ackerman and Auten (2006) build complex 
algorithms to attempt to account for additional variables affecting these measures. In addition, 
some previous studies only measure the combined average effects of permanent and transitory 
changes in income and tax price (Randolph, 1995). 
 
The estimation of elasticity raises additional empirical concerns with regards to endogeneity. 
Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity 
of income and endogeneity of giving both affect estimations of tax-price elasticity. Endogeneity 
of income occurs when a taxpayer chooses to work more or less (resulting in a higher or lower 
income) based on their expected taxable income. This can push the taxpayer into a higher (or 
lower) tax bracket. Endogeneity of giving occurs when a taxpayer chooses to donate more or less 
based on their expected tax rate. For example, if a taxpayer increases their donation, they could 
be pushed into a lower tax bracket since their taxable income will be lower (Bakija & Heim, 
2011). Both types of endogeneity can result in a taxpayer switching from non-itemization status 
to itemization status (or vice versa). Any change in tax price that results from endogeneity will 
inflate the magnitude of the estimated tax price elasticity making it appear that charitable giving 
is more responsive to changes in tax policies than it actually is. This is one of the reasons the 
first-dollar tax price and first-dollar tax liability are used to measure tax price and income 
(Barrett et al., 1997). 
 
Measurement of tax-price elasticity can further be broken down by whether it is measuring price 
elasticity on the intensive margin or extensive margin. Most studies referenced thus far have 
measured tax-price elasticity at the intensive margin (Almunia, Lockwood, & Scharf, 2017, 
draft). However, responsiveness, especially with respect to income differs based on whether 
elasticity is measured on the intensive margin or the extensive margin. The intensive margin 
measures the intensity or degree to which a resource is used. In other words, elasticities 
estimated on the intensive margin measure the percentage change in giving in response to the 
percentage change in price. This is the type of elasticity referred to throughout this paper. 
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Alternatively, the extensive margin measures how many people are using a resource. The 
extensive margin measures the total number of gifts (as opposed to the amount of the gift). High-
income households are more responsive on the intensive margin and intensive margin price 
elasticity tends to increase as income rises. On the other hand, low-income households are more 
responsive on the extensive margin and extensive margin price elasticity tends to decrease as 
income rises. This means that the average gift amount increases more for high-income 
households, while the number of gifts increases more for low-income households (Almunia et 
al., 2017, draft). 
 
Most literature finds that high income households are more responsive than low-income 
households (Auten et al., 2002). However, most of this research relies on administrative data 
from tax records and only includes itemizers. For a short time in the 1980s (1982 to 1986), the 
charitable deduction was available to non-itemizers. The “above-the-line” charitable deductions 
of the 1980s serves as a natural experiment for these calculations of the effects of a non-itemizer 
tax deduction. For 1982 and 1983, the IRS had set a ceiling of $100 ($50, married filing 
separately); non-itemizers could only deduct 25 percent of donations up to that amount. The 
ceiling was increased to $300 in 1984 and in 1985 removed completely—and taxpayers could 
deduct up to 50 percent of contributions. In the legislation’s final year (1986), non-itemized 
donations could be deducted at 100 percent (Duquette, 1999). Dunbar and Phillips (1997)’s study 
of 1985 and 1986 giving suggested that this policy change encouraged a substantial share of 
those who did not donate in 1985 to donate in 1986; overall, this policy change produced a price 
elasticity of non-itemizer donations of -3.36 (Dunbar & Phillips, 1997). In other words, if a non-
itemizer’s taxable income is decreased by 10 percent, their charitable giving will increase by 
33.6 percent. However, it should be noted that the 33.6 percent increase is not an average across 
all donors, but is a marginal effect holding all else constant. For example, if a non-itemizer 
would normally donate $100, the expected donation if the taxpayer were to switch from non-
itemization to itemization status with a marginal tax rate of 25 percent holding all other 
assumptions constant would be $184. Duquette (1999) contradicted this finding. Analyzing the 
same years as Dunbar and Phillips (1997), Duquette (1999) found that the price elasticities for 
both itemizers and non-itemizers indicate relatively low responsiveness (elasticities below one in 
absolute value). This finding is consistent with the findings by the Congressional Research 
Service, which suggest that price elasticities are relatively inelastic (Gravelle, 2005). Therefore, 
both the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office assume a price 
elasticity of -0.5 (Congressional Budget Office, 2011; Gravelle, 2005). 
 
The tax-price elasticity of giving also varies based on the dataset(s) used in the analyses. Most 
studies use tax-filer data from the IRS. However, a growing number of studies that use survey 
data. A meta-analysis of tax-price elasticity of charitable donations found that survey data yield a 
more responsive elasticity (-1.29) compared to tax-filer data (-1.08) (Peloza & Steel, 2005). 
Similarly, studies differ as to whether they use cross-sectional data or panel data (Randolph, 
1995). Cross-sectional data by definition only measures data at a single time-point. In doing so 
they only measure short-run price change (or incorrectly attribute permanence to transitory 
change in price) (Auten et al., 2002). Panel studies, which cover multiple years, allow for 
permanent price change and transitory price change to be measured separately. However, this 
introduces other complications (see above for a discussion of challenges in measuring permanent 
and transitory price change and the endogeneity effect). 
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Analysis of Proposals 
Since taxpayers compare the sum of deductions to the standard deduction when deciding whether 
to itemize, decreasing the value of any one of those itemized deductions may incentivize 
taxpayers to switch from itemizing to taking the standard deduction (Lu, 2017). This would raise 
the price of after-tax giving from $1 multiplied by 1 minus the marginal tax rate ($1*(1-MTR)) 
to $1 for every dollar donated. Increasing the standard deduction would also induce fewer 
taxpayers to itemize (Dale & Colinvaux, 2015).  
 
Types of Proposals 
The most popularly proposed changes to the charitable deduction include floors, caps, and 
credits (Galle et al., 2012). However, other changes not specifically aimed at the charitable 
deduction would also have an impact. An increase in marginal tax rate, like that seen in 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 was estimated to increase the amount given to charity, 
especially for high-income individuals (Rosenberg, Steuerle, & Toran, 2013). However, most 
proposals today suggest decreasing the top marginal tax rate, which would likely decrease 
charitable giving by high-income individuals. 
 
Floors 
The argument made in favor of floors is that allowing taxpayers to itemize donations, no matter 
the size, would be too costly to monitor. A floor would establish a defined threshold below 
which total deductions could not be claimed (Lowry, 2014). In these proposals, the revenue loss 
would be less than if the floor were not in place since no tax benefit is given to contributions 
below the floor (Galle et al., 2012). A 2%-AGI floor, for example, would annually recover $15 
billion in taxpayer revenue (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2017a). However, a 2%-AGI 
floor would decrease charitable giving by an estimated $3 billion (Congressional Budget Office, 
2011). 
 
Ackerman and Auten (2006), studying 1987-1996 tax returns, simulated taxpayers’ reactions to 
both a 1%-AGI floor and a flat-rate floor of $210/$420 married filing jointly, assuming price 
elasticities ranging from -0.5 to -1.0. While both the flat-rate and one percent floor would 
increase rates of giving and the total amount donated to charity, the flat-rate floor would 
incentivize slightly higher rates of charitable giving from both itemizers and non-itemizers and 
lead to increases in charitable giving by over $1 billion more than the one percent floor.  
 
A high floor could lead some donors to concentrate their giving in certain years in order to 
qualify for the charitable deduction in some years when they cannot in all years or simply 
discourage the possibility of smaller donations, but Ackerman and Auten (2006) found that a low 
floor of one percent would not encourage bunching. 
 
Caps 
The argument for a cap on charitable deductions is a notion of vertical equity or fairness that 
stipulates that high income households do not need (or deserve) unlimited tax deductions for 
their charitable contributions. A cap establishes a total limit on the ability of a taxpayer to benefit 
from charitable deductions (Feldstein, 2015). While the floor would impact lower-income 
taxpayers the most, a cap would impact high-income households the most. As high-income 
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households are both more likely to donate to charity and respond more to the incentives in the 
charitable deduction, the Urban Institute predicts that a cap would reduce the amount given to 
philanthropy while not recovering as much in taxpayer revenue (Galle et al., 2012). Additionally, 
a cap would likely not induce increased donation rates from non-itemizers. Our previous research 
on tax caps found that there was a relatively small effect at the top MTR for each percentage 
change in the tax cap (Rooney et al., 2011). 
 
Credits 
As opposed to tax deductions, which lower a taxpayer’s taxable income, tax credits reduce a 
taxpayers’ tax liability (United States Internal Revenue Service, 2012). A credit within the tax 
system could be available to both non-itemizers and itemizers (Galle et al., 2012), lowering taxes 
by a certain amount of the total amount donated by each taxpayer. The argument in favor of a tax 
credit is that it generates a stronger or clearer incentive to give to charities than a tax deduction 
and it can be designed for either all taxpayers or just for non-itemizers. In addition, everyone gets 
the same incentive as opposed to differing incentives based on their income level.  
 
Previous Proposals 
As the White House and Congress have been considering new tax policies to stimulate economic 
growth, there has been much discussion about the potential impact of the proposed tax changes 
on charitable giving. Tax policies have direct and indirect effects on a wide array of individual 
and household economic decisions, including charitable donations.  
 
Most proposed policies combine potential approaches to addressing the charitable deduction.  
While not ultimately passed, the Tax Reform Act of 2014, introduced by then-House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI), indicated a potential future direction for 
tax reform. Rosenberg, Steuerle, Steele, and Eng (2014) estimated that, taken together, all 
provisions in the proposed Act would increase the after-tax cost of charitable donations by 14 
percent, decreasing total charitable giving by individuals by between 7 and 14 percent 
(Rosenberg et al., 2014). The proposed legislation specifically suggested instituting both a floor 
of 2 percent AGI and a limit of 40 percent AGI to the charitable deduction, most impacting the 
top share of wealthiest taxpayers, but these suggested policies constituted less than half of the 
total projected reduction in charitable giving with the rest of the reduction in charitable giving 
resulting from an increased standard deduction and the elimination of other itemized deductions 
(Rosenberg et al., 2014). 
 
While potential directions for tax reform under the new administration are still unclear, the Tax 
Policy Center's analysis of Trump's proposals on the campaign trail offers a hint of the potential 
direction such reforms might take (Stallworth, Lu, & Steuerle, 2016). Taken together, the 
policies would reduce incentives for both low- and high-income households to give to charity. 
Greatly increasing the standard deduction would reduce the share of itemizing taxpayers by 60 
percent. While reducing marginal tax rates would result in lower taxes and increased after-tax 
income, which could be given to charity, the after-tax cost of private philanthropy would be 
higher, which would theoretically reduce giving – at least in the short-run. The proposals also 
include capping itemized deductions at $100,000 for individuals ($200,000 married filing 
jointly). Tax data for 2014 demonstrates that ultra-high-income taxpayers (over $1 million AGI) 
deducted, on average, $260,000 in state and local taxes and $165,000 in charitable gifts. With 
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such a low cap, high-income taxpayers—those most likely to donate—would face greatly 
reduced incentives to do so. By their estimates, these suggested reforms would result in a 4.5-9 
percent decline in individual giving, costing the nonprofit sector up to $26.1 billion in 2017.  
 
Methodology 
 
Tax policy analysis often relies on IRS Statistics of Income Public Use Files (SOI PUF). 
However, for analyses of policies that could affect the charitable giving of non-itemizers, these 
data in isolation are inadequate, as these files do not include data on giving by non-itemizers. In 
addition, much of this analysis relies on assumed elasticities for the effect of tax price on giving 
(-0.5 and -1.0) which may be an underestimate (see pages 11-15 for a full discussion on tax-price 
elasticity of giving) since the mean elasticity of giving found in a meta-analysis is approximately 
-1.4 (Peloza & Steel, 2005). We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to generate 
estimates for both giving by non-itemizers and elasticities for three different income groups 
(<50,000; $50-$99,999; ≥$100,000). The methods used to reach these estimates are described 
briefly below and in detail in Appendix A. These values are then used in conjunction with an IRS 
PUF to generate estimates of the policy effects of some common tax reform proposals: a 
decrease in the top marginal tax rate, an increase in the value of the standard deduction, and the 
expansion of the charitable deduction to all filers. 
 
Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Philanthropy Module 
The PSID is the largest and longest running longitudinal household survey in the world. From 
1968 through 2015, the PSID has collected 39 waves of data from the same families and their 
descendants, making the PSID a key empirical social science study in the United States. The 
long panel duration, genealogical design, and broad content provide social scientists with a 
unique and powerful opportunity to study the evolution and change within the same families and 
lineages as well as across households over decades. The PSID is ideally suited for the proposed 
research due to its longitudinal design and high quality of data. The Philanthropy Panel Study is 
the Philanthropy Module in the PSID and is the only existing panel dataset on charitable giving 
from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. Currently, seven waves of PSID data 
(2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013) have information on household giving. The 
2013 PSID includes approximately 9,000 families in the sample. The PSID currently provides a 
comprehensive picture of generosity for American families over a 12-year span, thus 
strengthening its position as a leading resource on life-course and multigenerational generosity 
behavior concerning the U.S. population. 
 
Federal individual income tax microsimulation model 
The Tax-Calculator simulates the U.S. federal individual income tax. In conjunction with micro 
data that represent the U.S. population (IRS PUF) and a set of behavioral assumptions, the Tax-
Calculator can be used to conduct revenue scoring and distributional analyses of tax policies. 
The Tax-Calculator is written in Python, an interpreted language that can execute on Windows, 
Mac, or Linux. Additional modifications have been made to the Tax Calculator for this project in 
order to incorporate data available from the PSID but not the IRS, such as non-itemizer giving 
and newly calculated tax-price elasticities of giving. See Appendix B for additional information 
regarding the methods used in the tax calculator. 
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Results from the Tax-Calculator microsimulation were generated by the Open-Source Policy 
Center at the American Enterprise Institute. (Tax Brain; Tax Calculator) 
 
The microsimulation compared projected charitable giving and net government revenue under 
six policy conditions to the current law. The six policy scenarios, described in Table 3, examine 
various combinations of three major policy changes:  
1. Increasing the value of the standard deduction to $11,000 for individuals and $22,000 for 
married couples 
2. Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers, and  
3. Decreasing the highest marginal tax rate to from 39.6 percent to 35 percent. 
 
Table 3. Summary of microsimulations 
 
Increased value of the 
Standard Deduction* 
Extension of Charitable 
Deduction 
Decrease in highest 
marginal tax rate to 35% 
Current Law N/A N/A N/A 
Scenario 1 Yes No No 
Scenario 2 No Yes No 
Scenario 3 No No Yes 
Scenario 4 Yes No Yes 
Scenario 5 Yes Yes No 
Scenario 6 Yes Yes Yes 
*$11,000 for individuals; $22,000 for joint filers 
 
Estimating tax-price elasticity of giving 
Table 4. Average giving & elasticities 
Income Bracket Percentage of Non-Itemizers Non-Itemizer Average Giving Elasticity 
<$50,000 73.5% $343 -2.236 
$50,000-99,999 21.3% $858 -1.490 
$100,000+ 5.3% $1,586 -1.182 
 
To estimate elasticities for each income group, we first use the PSID data mentioned earlier to 
construct a panel dataset of households with several years of information per each household. 
With panel data, we can run an ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed-effects regression which looks 
at the year-to-year changes in the variables tested. This helps by eliminating any time-constant 
sources of variation (e.g., gender, race). We also control for select time-variant variables, like 
income and wealth. We run this analysis on each of our three income brackets (See Appendix A 
for more detailed methods).  
 
Lower income brackets had larger reactions to changes in the tax price of giving, which is 
important for the interpretation of the effects, and particularly for estimating the change if the 
charitable deduction is expanded to all filers. While this finding differs from the majority of the 
literature, there is still significant debate among scholars with regards to calculations of these 
elasticities. It is logical that lower income households might have larger reactions to changes in 
the tax price of giving. Lower income households have less discretionary income. Because they 
are making larger “sacrifices” to give or to give more, it makes sense that they would be more 
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responsive than higher income households. However, on the other hand, because higher income 
households have more discretionary income, they have a greater ability to shift their giving based 
on anticipated changes in policy. Based on these findings for variable elasticities by income 
group, using an elasticity of -1.0 is only a slight underestimate of the changes for the upper-
income group (and may not be an underestimate of the very highest income groups – we can 
only test to $100,000+2 and it is possible that those in the very highest levels of income brackets 
would have an even smaller elasticity, given the directionality we see at the other levels), but it is 
significantly different from the elasticities most relevant to non-itemizers: <$50,000 AGI and 
$50,000-$99,999 (-2.2 and -1.5 respectively; see Table 4).  
 
This panel design opens up the research to methodologies that allow for an increase in accuracy 
over single wave data, as well as providing a unique glimpse into household giving among 
households who change itemization status between waves. 
 
Using the PSID, we can isolate households who either gained or lost itemizing status between 
waves. On average, 1,174 households (16.6 percent of the relevant sample) either gained or lost 
itemizing status between waves with households relatively evenly split between those gaining 
and losing. In addition to examining their change in itemization status, we looked at their change 
in giving (overall and by subsector) between each wave and can compare that change with the 
difference among those whose itemization status did not change.  
 
While pooled data from the five waves are used for most of these analyses, we also have the 
ability to separately examine the waves to determine if and when households change itemization 
status. There is an asymmetric effect on gaining itemization status, with four of the five waves 
showing a larger increase among those gaining itemization status than a decrease among those 
losing itemization status (both figures relative to those whose itemization status did not change). 
The differences in giving between new itemizers and new non-itemizers are always significant, 
even when looking at subsectors (see below for more information). 
 
  
                                                          
2 The PSID is representative of the income distribution for the bottom 97-98 percent (Gouskova, Andreski, & 
Schoeni, 2010; Pfeffer, Schoeni, Kennickell, & Andreski, 2016). 
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What are the potential effects of potential tax policy changes on charitable giving? 
 
Table 5: Changes in charitable giving and government revenue 
 
Giving, 
Total $ 
Change 
(millions) 
Giving, 
Total % 
Change 
Revenue, 
Total $ 
Change 
(millions) 
Revenue, 
Total % 
Change 
Net 
Difference*  
Net 
Difference 
(as % of 
revenue) 
Scenario 1 (Increase Standard Deduction)    
Elasticity of -.5 -$3,994.26 -1.40% -$64,222.32 -2.30% -$68,216.58 -2.44% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -$7,987.71 -2.81% -$64,222.32 -2.30% -$72,210.03 -2.59% 
Variable Elasticity -$10,966.58 -3.86% -$64,222.32 -2.30% -$75,188.90 -2.69% 
Scenario 2 (Universal Charitable Deduction)    
Elasticity of -.5 $3,772.16 1.33% -$11,574.28 -0.41% -$7,802.12 -0.28% 
Elasticity of -1.0 $7.543.56 2.65% -$12,353.78 -0.44% -$4,810.22 -0.17% 
Variable Elasticity $12,185.18 4.28% -$13,134.71 -0.47% -$949.53 -0.03% 
Scenario 3 (Decrease Top MTR to 35%)    
Elasticity of -.5 -$904.06 -0.32% -$24,483.74 -0.88% -$25,387.80 -0.91% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -$1.807.93 -0.64% -$24,180.15 -0.87% -$25,988.08 -0.93% 
Variable Elasticity -$2,137.19 -0.75% -$24,069.69 -0.86% -$26,206.88 -0.94% 
Scenario 4 (Increase Standard Deduction & Decrease Top MTR)   
Elasticity of -.5 -$4,891.42 -1.72% -$88,654.97 -3.17% -$93,546.39 -3.35% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -$9.781.86 -3.44% -$88,353.53 -3.16% -$98,135.39 -3.51% 
Variable Elasticity -$13,087.48 -4.60% -$88,243.88 -3.16% -$101,331.36 -3.63% 
Scenario 5 (Increase Standard Deduction & Universal Charitable Deduction  
Elasticity of -.5 $1,985.11 0.70% -$81,150.20 -2.91% -$79,165.09 -2.83% 
Elasticity of -1.0 $3.969.83 1.40% -$81,682.52 -2.92% -$77,712.69 -2.78% 
Variable Elasticity $6,983.23 2.46% -$82,246.69 -2.94% -$75,263.46 -2.69% 
Scenario 6 (Increase Standard Deduction, Universal Charitable Deduction, Decrease Top MTR) 
Elasticity of -.5 $1,075.01 0.38% -$105,463.10 -3.78% -$104,388.09 -3.74% 
Elasticity of -1.0 $2.149.80 0.76% -$105,685.63 -3.78% -$103,535.83 -3.71% 
Variable Elasticity $4,831.75 1.70% -$106,137.32 -3.80% -$101,305.57 -3.63% 
*Charitable Change + Revenue Change 
 
Using the Camp Proposal as an estimate of the various proposals currently under discussion in 
the White House and Congress (see Table 1 for a comparison of the current proposals), our 
analyses show a universally negative effect of increasing the standard deduction and decreasing 
the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent on both household charitable giving and federal tax 
revenue. First, examining the increase in the standard deduction (scenario 1) and the decrease in 
the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent separately (scenario 3) shows that the proposed increase 
in the standard deduction has a larger predicted effect on both charitable giving and tax revenue 
than the proposed decrease in the marginal tax rate.  
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Results 
 
We analyzed the various proposals using the tax-price elasticities calculated from panel data as 
well as estimates used in prior studies. The panel data used to calculate the estimates of tax-price 
elasticity includes data on both itemizers’ and non-itemizers’ giving. These estimates, which 
vary by income category (see Table 2 for elasticities), may be larger than some prior estimates 
and suggest that taxpayers are more responsive to changes in tax policy. 
 
Scenario 1: Increase in standard deduction 
Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, increasing the standard deduction would decrease 
charitable giving by $11.0 billion (-3.9 percent) and tax revenue by $64.2 billion (-2.3 percent). 
 
Scenario 3: Decrease in top marginal tax rate 
Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, decreasing the top marginal tax rate would 
decrease charitable giving by $2.1 billion (-0.8 percent) and tax revenue by $24.1 billion (-0.9 
percent). 
 
Scenario 4: Combined effect of increase in the standard deduction and decrease in the top 
marginal tax rate 
Scenario 4 is based on the Camp Proposal and closely resembles the proposals currently under 
consideration by the White House and Congress. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, 
the combined proposals would decrease charitable giving by $13.1 billion (-4.6 percent) and tax 
revenue by $88.2 billion (-3.2 percent). 
 
To summarize, if taxpayers are highly responsive to changes in tax policy, increasing the 
standard deduction would decrease charitable giving by $11.0 billion (-3.9 percent) and decrease 
tax revenue by $64.2 billion (-2.3 percent); decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent 
would decrease charitable giving by $2.1 billion (-0.8 percent) and decrease tax revenue by 
$24.5 billion (-0.88 percent); and the combined proposals would decrease charitable giving by 
$13.1 billion (-4.6 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $88.7 billion (-3.2 percent). 
 
Additional Results 
 
We also consider the analysis of each proposal using some commonly used elasticities: less 
responsive, -0.5 & moderately responsive, -1.0.  
 
Scenario 1: Increase in standard deduction 
When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is assumed, increasing the standard deduction would 
decrease charitable giving by $4.0 billion (-1.4 percent) and tax revenue by $64.2 billion (-2.3 
percent). Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), increasing the standard deduction 
would decrease charitable giving by $8.0 billion (-2.8 percent) and tax revenue by $64.2 billion 
(-2.3 percent). 
 
Scenario 3: Decrease in top marginal tax rate 
When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is assumed, decreasing the top marginal tax rate would 
decrease charitable giving by $0.9 billion (-0.3 percent) and tax revenue by $24.5 billion (-0.9 
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percent). Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), decreasing the top marginal tax rate 
would decrease charitable giving by $1.8 billion (-0.6 percent) and tax revenue by $24.2 billion 
(-0.9 percent). 
 
Scenario 4: Combined effect of increase in the standard deduction and decrease in the top 
marginal tax rate 
Scenario 4 is based on the Camp Proposal and closely resembles the proposals currently under 
consideration by the White House and Congress. When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is 
assumed, the combined proposals would decrease charitable giving by $4.9 billion (-1.7 percent) 
and tax revenue by $88.7 billion (-3.2 percent). Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), 
the combined proposals would decrease charitable giving by $9.8 billion (-3.4 percent) and tax 
revenue by $88.4 billion (-3.2 percent). 
 
Overall, taxpayers responsiveness to changes in tax policy could vary based on the extent of 
responsiveness to changes in incentives, holding other factors constant. However, it is highly 
unlikely that they will not respond at all to potential changes in tax policy. In fact, the results of 
our calculations to estimate elasticity by income suggest that taxpayers will tend to be more 
responsive to these changes. Regardless, it is important to consider the possible range of 
outcomes. If low responsiveness, moderate responsiveness, and high responsiveness are all taken 
into account, increasing the standard deduction would decrease charitable giving by $4.0 billion 
to $11.0 billion (-1.4 percent to -3.9 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $64.2 billion (-2.3 
percent); decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent would decrease charitable giving by 
$0.9 billion to $2.1 billion (-.3 percent to -0.8 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $24.1 billion 
to $24.5 billion (-0.86 percent to -0.88 percent); and the combined proposals would decrease 
charitable giving by $4.9 billion to $13.1 billion (-1.7 percent to -4.6 percent) and decrease tax 
revenue by $88.2 billion to $88.7 billion (-3.2 percent). On the whole, it is clear that increasing 
the standard deduction and decreasing the top marginal tax rate will have a negative effect on 
both household charitable giving and federal tax revenue. These reductions are likely to have a 
negative effect on the non-profit sector as a whole, both because of lower donations and 
reductions federal funding to the sector. 
 
 
What is the effect on charitable giving if the charitable deduction is expanded to non-
itemizers, in addition to itemizers? 
 
Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers may be one way to recoup some of the 
potential losses in charitable donations caused by the various proposals under consideration. Our 
analyses show a positive effect of extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers on 
charitable giving. However, this policy (alone and combined with other proposals) still has a 
negative effect on treasury revenue. 
 
Results 
 
We analyzed the various proposals using the tax-price elasticities calculated from panel data as 
well as estimates used in prior studies. The panel data used to calculate the estimates of tax-price 
elasticity includes data on both itemizers’ and non-itemizers’ giving. These estimates, which 
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vary by income category (see Table 2 for elasticities), may be larger than some prior estimates 
and suggest that taxpayers are more responsive to changes in tax policy. 
 
Scenario 2: Extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers 
Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers 
would increase charitable giving by $12.2 billion (4.3 percent) and decrease tax revenue by 
$13.1 billion (-0.5 percent). The net difference between charitable giving and tax revenue would 
be -$0.9 billion (-0.03 percent). Among the presented policy options, this scenario has the 
greatest positive impact on charitable giving and the smallest negative impact on Treasury 
revenues. 
 
Scenario 5: Increase of the standard deduction and extension of the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers 
Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, increasing the standard deduction along with the 
extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by $7.0 
billion (2.5 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $82.2 billion (-2.9 percent). 
 
Scenario 6: Increase of the standard deduction, decrease in the marginal tax rate, and extension 
of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers 
Under the two proposed policies (increase in the standard deduction and decrease in the top 
marginal tax rate), giving decreases. However, if the charitable deduction is extended to non-
itemizers, total giving increases. In other words, the positive effects of extending the charitable 
deduction to non-itemizers more than offsets the negative effects of the other two policy changes 
on giving. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found, the combined effects of all three 
proposals would increase charitable giving by $4.8 billion (1.7 percent) and decrease tax revenue 
by $106.1 billion (-3.8 percent). 
 
Isolated effects of adding the extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers to the 
current proposals of increasing the standard deduction and decreasing the top marginal tax rate 
By comparing Scenario 6 to Scenario 4, it is possible to isolate the effect of including the 
extension of the non-itemizer deduction with the currently proposed increase in the standard 
deduction and decrease in the top marginal tax rate. Using the tax-price elasticities that we 
found, adding the non-itemizer charitable deduction to the other proposals has a slightly greater 
effect on charitable giving than the loss in tax revenue ($26 million). However, this difference is 
small and disappears completely when moderate or low responsiveness is assumed, -$5.4 billion 
and -$10.8 billion respectively. 
 
All policies that include extending the charitable deduction to all filers (scenarios 2, 5, and 6) 
have a positive effect on charitable giving. However, the gain in charitable giving comes at an 
equivalent or greater cost in federal tax revenue. None of the proposals analyzed in this study are 
treasury efficient ways to increase donations to charity. To summarize, only extending the 
charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by $12.2 billion (4.3 
percent) and decrease tax revenue by $13.1 billion (-0.5 percent), increasing the standard 
deduction and extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable 
giving by $7.0 billion (2.5 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $82.2 billion (-2.9 percent), and 
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the three proposals combined would increase charitable giving by $4.8 billion (1.7 percent) and 
decrease tax revenue by $106.1 billion (-3.8 percent). 
 
Additional Results 
 
We also consider the analysis of each proposal using some commonly used elasticities: less 
responsive, -0.5 & moderately responsive, -1.0.  
 
Scenario 2: Extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers 
When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is assumed, extending the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers would increase charitable giving by $3.8 billion (1.3 percent) and decrease tax revenue 
by $11.6 billion (-0.4 percent). Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), extending the 
charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by $7.5 billion (2.7 
percent) and decrease tax revenue by $12.4 billion (-0.44 percent). Most importantly, the net 
effect of extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers is negligible (less than -0.3 percent 
of revenue) regardless of the assumed elasticity used in the analysis. If low responsiveness, 
moderate responsiveness, and high responsiveness are all taken into account, the net difference 
between charitable giving and tax revenue would be expected to range from -$7.8 billion (-0.3 
percent) to -$0.9 billion (-0.03 percent). Regardless of the assumed elasticity, this scenario has 
the greatest positive impact on charitable giving across all of the proposed policy options. 
 
Scenario 5: Increase of the standard deduction and extension of the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers 
When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is assumed, increasing the standard deduction along with 
the extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by 
$2.0 billion (0.7 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $81.2 billion (-2.9 percent). Using a 
moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), increasing the standard deduction along with the 
extension of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by $4.0 
billion (1.4 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $81.7 billion (-2.9 percent). 
 
Scenario 6: Increase of the standard deduction, decrease in the marginal tax rate, and extension 
of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers 
When the extension of the charitable deduction is included with the two proposed policies 
(increase in the standard deduction and decrease in the top marginal tax rate), total giving 
increases. When a less responsive elasticity (-0.5) is assumed, the combined effects of all three 
proposals would increase charitable giving by $1.1 billion (0.4 percent) and decrease tax revenue 
by $105.5 billion (-3.8 percent). Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), the combined 
effects of all three proposals would increase charitable giving by $2.1 billion (0.8 percent) and 
decrease tax revenue by $105.7 billion (-3.8 percent). 
 
Overall, taxpayers responsiveness to changes in tax policy could fall anywhere from not at all 
responsive to highly responsive. However, it is highly unlikely that they will not respond at all to 
potential changes in tax policy. In fact, the results of our calculations to estimate elasticity by 
income suggest, that taxpayers will be highly responsive to these changes. Regardless, it is 
important to consider the possible range of outcomes. If low responsiveness, moderate 
responsiveness, and high responsiveness are all taken into account, only extending the charitable 
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deduction to non-itemizers would increase charitable giving by $3.8 billion to $12.2 billion (1.3 
percent to 4.3 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $11.6 billion to $13.1 billion (-0.4 percent to 
-0.5 percent), increasing the standard deduction and extending the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers would increase charitable giving by $2.0 billion to $7.0 billion (0.7 percent to 2.5 
percent) and decrease tax revenue by $81.2 billion to $82.2 billion (-2.9 percent), and the three 
proposals combined would increase charitable giving by $1.1 billion to $4.8 billion (0.4 percent 
to 1.7 percent) and decrease tax revenue by $105.5 billion to $106.1 billion (-3.8 percent). 
 
How do the proposed tax policy changes affect taxpayers’ charitable giving across income 
levels and by charitable subsector (giving to religious congregations vs. giving to other 
charities)? 
 
By income level 
 
Table 6. Percent change in total giving by income group 
 Under $50,000 $50,000-$99,999 $100,000+ 
Scenario 1 (Increase Standard Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 -0.60 -2.31 -1.39 
Elasticity of -1.0 -1.19 -4.63 -2.77 
Variable Elasticity -2.67 -6.90 -3.28 
Scenario 2 (Universal Charitable Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 1.87 2.81 0.66 
Elasticity of -1.0 3.74 5.62 1.31 
Variable Elasticity 8.37 8.38 1.55 
Scenario 3 (Decrease Top MTR to 35%) 
Elasticity of -.5 0.00 0.00 -0.53 
Elasticity of -1.0 0.00 0.00 -1.06 
Variable Elasticity 0.00 0.00 -1.25 
Scenario 4 (Increase Standard Deduction & Decrease Top MTR) 
Elasticity of -.5 -0.60 -2.31 -1.91 
Elasticity of -1.0 -1.19 -4.63 -3.82 
Variable Elasticity -2.67 -6.90 -4.52 
Scenario 5 (Increase Standard Deduction & Universal Charitable Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 1.18 2.43 -0.03 
Elasticity of -1.0 2.37 4.87 -0.06 
Variable Elasticity 5.30 7.25 -0.07 
Scenario 6 (Increase Standard Deduction, Universal Charitable Deduction, Decrease Top MTR) 
Elasticity of -.5 1.18 2.43 -0.56 
Elasticity of -1.0 2.37 4.87 -1.13 
Variable Elasticity 5.30 7.25 -1.34 
 
Regardless of the assumed elasticity, middle-income households are most affected by each 
proposal, showing the largest percent change in total giving.  
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Results 
 
Low-income (<$50,000) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by middle-
income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-2.2), total charitable giving 
by low-income households will decrease 1.2 percent. On the other hand, extending the charitable 
deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on total giving by low-income 
households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-2.2), total charitable giving by low-
income households will increase 8.4 percent. 
 
Decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent has no effect on giving by low-income 
households. Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction 
to non-itemizers has an overall positive effect on total giving by low-income households (with or 
without decreasing the top marginal tax rate). Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-
2.2), total charitable giving by low-income households will increase 5.3 percent. 
 
Middle-income ($50,000-$99,999) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by middle-
income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-1.5), total charitable giving 
by middle-income households will decrease 6.9 percent. On the other hand, extending the 
charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on total giving by middle-
income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-1.5), total charitable giving 
by middle-income households will increase 8.4 percent. 
 
Decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent has no effect on giving by middle-income 
households. Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction 
to non-itemizers has an overall positive effect on total giving by middle-income households 
(with or without decreasing the top marginal tax rate). Using the tax-price elasticities that we 
found,(-1.5), total charitable giving by middle-income households will increase 7.3 percent. 
 
High-income (≥$100,000) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by high-
income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-1.2), total charitable giving 
by high-income households will decrease 3.3 percent. On the other hand, extending the 
charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on total giving by high-
income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-1.2), total charitable giving 
by high-income households will increase 1.6 percent.  
 
Unlike low- and middle-income households, decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent 
has a negative effect on giving by high-income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that 
we found (-1.2), total charitable giving by high-income households will decrease 1.3 percent. 
 
Increasing the standard deduction and decreasing the top marginal tax rate will have the largest 
negative effect on total giving by high-income households. Using the tax-price elasticities that 
we found (-1.2), total charitable giving by high-income households will decrease 4.5 percent. 
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Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers has an overall negative, but minimal effect on total giving by high-income households. 
Regardless of the assumed responsiveness, charitable giving by high-income households will 
decrease by less than 0.1 percent. 
 
If the expanded charitable deduction to non-itemizers is included with an increase in the standard 
deduction and a decrease in the top marginal tax rate, giving by high-income households will still 
decrease. Using the tax-price elasticities that we found (-1.2), total charitable giving by high-
income households will decrease 1.4 percent. 
 
Additional Results 
 
We also consider the analysis of each proposal using some commonly used elasticities: less 
responsive, -0.5 & moderately responsive, -1.0.  
 
Low-income (<$50,000) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by low-income 
households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable giving by low-income 
households will decrease by 0.6 percent. Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), total 
charitable giving by low-income households will decrease by 2.7 percent. On the other hand, 
extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on total 
giving by low-income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable 
giving by low-income households will increase by 1.9 percent. Using a moderately responsive 
elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by low-income households will increase by 3.7 percent.  
 
Decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent has no effect on giving by low-income 
households. Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction 
to non-itemizers has an overall positive effect on total giving by low-income households (with or 
without decreasing the top marginal tax rate). If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total 
charitable giving by low-income households will increase by 1.2 percent. Using a moderately 
responsive elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by low-income households will increase by 
2.4 percent. 
 
Middle-income ($50,000-$99,999) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by middle-
income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable giving by middle-
income households will decrease by 2.3 percent. Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), 
total charitable giving by middle-income households will decrease by 4.6 percent. On the other 
hand, extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on 
total giving by middle-income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total 
charitable giving by middle-income households will increase by 2.8 percent. Using a moderately 
responsive elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by middle-income households will increase by 
5.6 percent.  
 
Decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent has no effect on giving by middle-income 
households. Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction 
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to non-itemizers has an overall positive effect on total giving by middle-income households 
(with or without decreasing the top marginal tax rate). If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, 
total charitable giving by middle-income households will increase by 2.4 percent. Using a 
moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by middle-income households will 
increase by 4.9 percent. 
 
High-income (≥$100,000) 
Increasing the standard deduction has a universally negative effect on total giving by high-
income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable giving by high-
income households will decrease by 1.4 percent. Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), 
total charitable giving by high-income households will decrease by 2.8 percent. On the other 
hand, extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a universally positive effect on 
total giving by high-income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable 
giving by high-income households will increase by 0.7 percent. Using a moderately responsive 
elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by high-income households will increase by 1.3 percent.  
 
Unlike low- and middle-income households, decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35 percent 
has a negative effect on giving by high-income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is 
assumed, total charitable giving by high-income households will decrease by 0.5 percent. Using 
a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by high-income households will 
decrease by 1.1 percent. 
 
Increasing the standard deduction and decreasing the top marginal tax rate will have the largest 
negative effect on total giving by high-income households. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is 
assumed, total charitable giving by high-income households will decrease by 1.9 percent. Using 
a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), total charitable giving by high-income households will 
decrease by 3.8 percent. 
 
Together, increasing the standard deduction and expanding the charitable deduction to non-
itemizers has an overall negative, but minimal effect on total giving by high-income households. 
Regardless of the assumed responsiveness, charitable giving by high-income households will 
decrease by less than 0.1 percent. 
 
If the expanded charitable deduction to non-itemizers is included with an increase in the standard 
deduction and a decrease in the top marginal tax rate, giving by high-income households will still 
decrease. If low responsiveness (-0.5) is assumed, total charitable giving by high-income 
households will decrease by 0.6 percent. Using a moderately responsive elasticity (-1.0), total 
charitable giving by high-income households will decrease by 1.1 percent. 
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By charitable subsector 
 
Table 7. Percent change in religious vs. secular giving 
 
Giving % Change, 
Total 
Giving % Change, 
Religious 
Giving % Change,  
Secular 
Scenario 1 (Increase Standard Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 -1.40% -1.44% -1.36% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -2.81% -2.87% -2.72% 
Variable Elasticity -3.86% -4.00% -3.66% 
Scenario 2 (Universal Charitable Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 1.33% 1.10% 1.64% 
Elasticity of -1.0 2.65% 2.21% 3.27% 
Variable Elasticity 4.28% 3.81% 4.95% 
Scenario 3 (Decrease Top MTR to 35%) 
Elasticity of -.5 -0.32% -0.31% -0.33% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -0.64% -0.62% -0.66% 
Variable Elasticity -0.75% -0.73% -0.78% 
Scenario 4 (Increase Standard Deduction & Decrease Top MTR) 
Elasticity of -.5 -1.72% -1.74% -1.69% 
Elasticity of -1.0 -3.44% -3.48% -3.38% 
Variable Elasticity -4.60% -4.72% -4.43% 
Scenario 5 (Increase Standard Deduction & Universal Charitable Deduction) 
Elasticity of -.5 0.70% 0.49% 0.98% 
Elasticity of -1.0 1.40% 0.99% 1.97% 
Variable Elasticity 2.46% 1.99% 3.10% 
Scenario 6 (Increase Standard Deduction, Universal Charitable Deduction, Decrease Top MTR) 
Elasticity of -.5 0.38% 0.18% 0.65% 
Elasticity of -1.0 0.76% 0.37% 1.30% 
Variable Elasticity 1.70% 1.26% 2.31% 
 
The various policy proposals discussed throughout this study have varying impacts on both 
giving to religious congregations and giving to other charities.  
 
Results 
 
Both increasing the standard deduction alone and increasing the standard deduction in 
conjunction with decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35% have a slightly larger effect on 
giving to religious congregations than on giving to other charities. Using the tax-price elasticities 
that we found, increasing the standard deduction alone will decrease giving to religious 
congregations by 4.0 percent and giving to other charities by 3.7 percent. Decreasing the top 
marginal tax rate to 35% will have a slightly larger effect on giving to other charities than on 
giving to religious congregations: using the tax-price elasticities that we found, giving to other 
charities will decrease by 0.8 percent and giving to religious congregations will decrease by 0.7 
percent. Increasing the standard deduction and decreasing the top marginal tax rate together will 
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decrease giving to religious congregations by 4.7 percent and giving to other charities by 4.4 
percent. This is driven by the effects of increasing the standard deduction. 
 
Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a larger effect on giving to other 
charities than giving to religious congregations: using the tax-price elasticities that we found, 
giving to other charities will increase by 4.9 percent and giving to religious congregations will 
increase by 3.8 percent. Together, increasing the standard deduction and extending the charitable 
deduction to non-itemizers will have a larger effect on giving to other charities: using the tax-
price elasticities that we found, giving to other charities will increase by 3.1 percent and giving 
to religious congregations will increase by 2.0 percent. 
 
With all three proposals together (increase in the standard deduction, decrease in the top 
marginal tax rate, and universal charitable deduction), giving to other charities is more affected 
than giving to religious congregations: using the tax-price elasticities that we found, giving to 
other charities will increase by 2.3 percent and giving to religious congregations will increase by 
1.3 percent. 
 
While there are some differences in how religious and giving to other charities are affected by 
the proposed policy changes, most differences are relatively small and overall, giving to religious 
congregations and giving to other charities are affected relatively evenly. 
 
These results somewhat contrast what we found when looking at the changes in giving among 
households that changed itemization status within the PSID panel. In our tests of itemization 
change and its effect on giving, for the earlier waves, we see a very marked difference between 
subsectors, with giving to religious congregations being about twice as affected by the 
itemization change than giving to other charities. For instance, between 2001 and 2013 
households that gained itemization status give about $45 more, on average, to other causes than 
those whose itemization status didn't change. Those same households give about $81 more to 
religious congregations than those whose itemization status didn’t change. Households that lost 
itemization status, give about $21 less to other causes and about $58 less to religious 
congregations than households whose itemization status didn’t change.  
 
This discrepancy is likely a matter of income representation. If looking only at the two lower 
income brackets in our microsimulation, we continue to see a similar split, with giving to 
religious congregations being affected at between 137-194 percent the extent of giving to other 
charities. 
 
Additional Results 
 
We also consider the analysis of each proposal using some commonly used elasticities: less 
responsive, -0.5 & moderately responsive, -1.0.  
 
Both increasing the standard deduction alone and increasing the standard deduction in 
conjunction with decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35% have a slightly larger effect on 
giving to religious congregations than on giving to other charities. Assuming a low to moderate 
responsiveness (elasticities: -0.5 to -1.0), increasing the standard deduction alone will decrease 
Tax Policy and Charitable Giving  31 
 
 
© 2017 The Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. All rights reserved. 
giving to religious congregations by 1.4 to 2.9 percent and giving to other charities by 1.4 to 2.7 
percent. Decreasing the top marginal tax rate to 35% will have a slightly larger effect on giving 
to other charities than on giving to religious congregations: assuming a low to moderate 
responsiveness (elasticities: -0.5 to -1.0), giving to other charities will decrease by 0.3 to 0.7 
percent and giving to religious congregations will decrease by 0.3 to 0.6 percent. Assuming a 
low to moderate responsiveness (elasticities: -0.5 to -1.0), increasing the standard deduction and 
decreasing the top marginal tax rate together will decrease giving to religious congregations by 
1.7 to 3.5 percent and giving to other charities by 1.7 to 3.4 percent. This is driven by the effects 
of increasing the standard deduction. 
 
Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers has a larger effect on giving to other 
charities than giving to religious congregations: assuming a low to moderate responsiveness 
(elasticities: -0.5 to -1.0), giving to other charities will increase by 1.7 to 3.3 percent and giving 
to religious congregations will increase by 1.1 to 2.2 percent. Together, increasing the standard 
deduction and extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers will have a larger effect on 
giving to other charities: assuming a low to moderate responsiveness (elasticities: -0.5 to -1.0), 
giving to other charities will increase by 1.0 to 2.0 percent and giving to religious congregations 
will increase by 0.5 to 1.0 percent. 
 
With all three proposals together (increase in the standard deduction, decrease in the top 
marginal tax rate, and universal charitable deduction), giving to other charities is more affected 
than giving to religious congregations: assuming a low to moderate responsiveness (elasticities: -
0.5 to -1.0), giving to other charities will increase by 0.7 to 1.3 percent and giving to religious 
congregations will increase by 0.2 to 0.4 percent. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
 
Assumptions about non-itemizers 
One limitation of that is common to this literature is the assumption that non-itemizers will share 
a tax-price of giving elasticity with itemizers. In other words, the assumption being made is that 
their behavior will be the same when it is likely that there are actually some differences in their 
behavior. However, there is no feasible way to calculate a tax price elasticity for a sample 
defined by not having any variation in tax price. 
 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is another limitation common to research in this area. This study deals with this 
issue by using a fixed-effects model containing itemizers & non-itemizers and controlling for 
itemization status. 
 
Reliance on 2009 PUF data 
The 2009 IRS SOI PUF is the most recently available dataset. While it would be ideal to have 
data from the most recent tax year, this is not possible. Therefore, we use the best available 
dataset and project forward to 2017. Also, we use the PPS in addition to the PUF to better 
capture giving at all income levels and the PPS is available through 2013 providing slightly more 
recent data. 
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Use of the PSID 
Since the PSID is not representative for high net-worth households (top 2-3% of households), the 
estimated baseline total for individual giving might be an underestimate. However, most of the 
previous research in this area is based on tax return data which do not accurately capture giving 
by low- and middle-income households. Therefore, the benefits of using the PSID, which is 
nationally representative for 97-98% of the population and includes a cross-section of lower- and 
middle-class households, greatly outweigh the limitations at the highest net-worth households. 
Another strength of the PSID is the wealth of information collected about each household. The 
PPS is the most comprehensive data currently available measuring household giving. Since the 
PPS is part of the larger PSID, household level data is available on a wide range of variables 
including wealth, income, family composition, etc. 
 
Using a fixed-effects model requires panel data and, unlike with tax data, households stay in the 
sample whether or not the household gains or loses itemizing status, so the direct effect of this 
can be somewhat controlled for. The fixed-effects model helps to control for time-invariant 
conditions, down to the household level, so that even variables that cannot be observed can be 
controlled for. The model also allows control for key variables – income, wealth, marital status – 
which can change over time and are observed, so that their effect is factored out of the value 
found for change due to price of giving. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Changes in tax policy have the potential to affect charitable giving across income levels to both 
religious and secular giving. With the new administration in the White House, tax reform has 
once again become a central issue in Washington, D.C. Therefore, it is important to consider 
how changes in tax policy, particularly policies about the charitable deduction and itemization 
status, will affect charitable giving overall and by subsector. In particular, all policies considered 
in this study that include expanding the charitable deduction to all filers have a positive effect on 
charitable giving. However, the gain in charitable giving comes at cost to government revenue. 
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Appendix A: Methodology for calculating tax-price elasticity of giving  
 
To estimate our tax-price elasticities, we conducted a fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression on the PSID panel, 2001-2013. The dependent variable was giving; the independent 
variables were age, if the household had children living with them, if they were married, pre-tax 
family income, wealth without home equity, itemization status, and the tax price faced by the 
household (as estimated by Taxsim). The amounts were all logged, and all dollar amounts were 
inflated to 2016 dollars. We separated the sample into 3 brackets based on estimated AGI: 
<$50k, $50k-$100k, and $100k+, so that different elasticities could be found for each. 
 
Fixed-effects was chosen, instead of a pooled OLS or random effects, so that as much time-
invariant effects could be eliminated, and specifically so that year-to-year differences could be 
correlated. This helps correct for some of the permanent vs transitory income effects referenced 
in pooled OLS/pooled tobit work. The year-to-year effects help boost FE over random-effects, 
and is also why we chose to do a panel OLS instead of a panel tobit. A random effects panel tobit 
was estimated (with year dummies being added to those models), and the elasticities found then 
were typically larger (in an absolute sense) than in the fixed-effects model. Additionally, there 
are very few households (~15%) in our sample who never give, which lessens (but not totally 
eliminates) the necessity of tobit to take help in the controlling of incidence effects. 
 
PSID offers a few advantages over the tax data used for much of this work. It’s a more accurate 
distribution of households, since non-itemizers represent the bulk of US households and are not 
captured in tax data. Income brackets being done on tax data, then, must be checked before direct 
comparison with ours; an income bracket that begins at <$200k does not tell the same story as 
ours, and any finding that the directionality of the results is not the same is not necessarily 
surprising. Additionally, wealth, which is pretty important to giving, is not recorded in income 
work, and so cannot be controlled for with tax data only. 
 
Including itemization status helps control for the endogeneity caused by those threshold 
households which flip between itemizing and not; we see that this impact is, in fact, a relatively 
large & significant one, and without this control we would see a larger result. 
 
There are problems with using the PSID for this work. Tax data, for instance, must largely be 
imputed. AGI is imputed from taxsim (a widely used resource to impute tax rates for households 
when the actual rate is unknown), as is the tax-price.  
 
To check the robustness of our estimated elasticities, we calculated elasticities under a number of 
conditions. Wealth does not have a large effect on the elasticities; if wealth is not controlled for, 
all three elasticities decrease in absolute value only slightly (less than 0.1). Since there is not a 
commonly accepted way to deal with endogeneity when calculating elasticities, we dealt with 
this issue by controlling for itemization status. However, we conducted checks by calculating 
elasticities with slight modifications to how itemization is measured and/or controlled for. If we 
do not control for itemization status, the magnitude of the elasticities all increase with the 
elasticity for the low income bracket increasing significantly. One of the strengths of using the 
PSID to calculate elasticities is the inclusion of non-itemizers in the sample. However, if we 
limit our sample to itemizers, then we see a slight drop in the <$50k elasticity and slight 
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increases in the other two elasticities. On the other hand, if we limit the sample to households 
which itemized both in the present period and the period prior (“consistent itemizers”), there 
would be almost no change in the elasticities for the low- and middle-income brackets (decreases 
in the elasticity by 0.02 and 0.03 respectively). However, the high-income elasticity would drop 
to -0.818. This is important to note because this estimate is relatively close to what the literature 
gives as the “general” elasticity and these would be the households that a lot of this literature is 
based on (particularly studies that reliant on tax data). 
 
Table A-1. Calculated elasticities with various restrictions 
Restriction Full Sample Low-Income Sample Only 
Middle-Income 
Sample Only 
High-Income 
Sample Only 
All income -1.344 -2.236* -1.490* -1.182* 
Only Itemizers (Current 
Period Itemized) -1.550 -2.06 -1.774 -1.366 
Only Itemizers (Current + 
Previous Period Itemized) -1.227 -2.216 -1.46 -0.818 
Only Itemizers (Always 
Itemize) -1.271 -2.355 -1.393 -1.192 
Only Married Households -1.306 -3.449 -1.508 -1.285 
Exclude wealth -1.336 -2.203 -1.480 -1.179 
Exclude itemization status -2.328 -4.054 -2.346 -1.339 
Exclude demographic 
variables (number of 
children) 
-1.452 -2.438 -1.402 -1.174 
Use average income -1.615 -2.450 -1.708 -1.380 
*These are the elasticities used throughout this study. 
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Appendix B: Methodology for tax-calculator 
 
The Tax-Calculator simulates the U.S. federal individual income tax. In conjunction with micro 
data that represent the U.S. population (IRS PUF) and a set of behavioral assumptions, the Tax-
Calculator can be used to conduct revenue scoring and distributional analyses of tax policies. 
The Tax-Calculator is written in Python, an interpreted language that can execute on Windows, 
Mac, or Linux. Additional modifications have been made to the Tax-Calculator for this project in 
order to incorporate data available from the PSID but not the IRS, such as non-itemizer giving 
and newly calculated tax-price elasticities of giving.  
 
Results from the Tax-Calculator microsimulation were generated by the Open-Source Policy 
Center at the American Enterprise Institute. (Tax Brain; Tax Calculator) 
 
The microsimulation compared projected charitable giving and net government revenue under 
six policy conditions to the current law. The six policy scenarios, described in Table 3, examine 
various combinations of three major policy changes:  
1. Increasing the value of the standard deduction to $11,000 for individuals and $22,000 for 
married couples 
2. Extending the charitable deduction to non-itemizers, and  
3. Decreasing the highest marginal tax rate to from 39.6 percent to 35 percent. 
 
OSPC modified the Tax-Calculator to allow us to simulate specific policy changes under certain 
conditions (low responsiveness, moderate responsiveness, and high responsiveness). Tax Brain is 
the easy to use interface for the Tax-Calculator (Tax Brain). The interface allows users to 
estimate changes in income tax liability and payroll tax liability under different policy 
assumptions and includes key provisions for the Clinton 2016 Campaign Proposal, Trump 2016 
Campaign Proposal, the Brady-Ryan Plan, and the 2017 Trump Administration Proposal. Tax 
Brain allows users to change a variety of parameters: payroll taxes, social security taxability, 
above-the-line deductions, personal exemptions, standard deduction, personal refundable credit, 
itemized deductions, capital gains and dividends, personal income, nonrefundable credits, other 
taxes, refundable credits, and surtaxes. Freely available analyses rely on a subset of the 2009 IRS 
SOI Public Use File (PUF) and the 2013 Census Current Population Survey (Github.com). 
However, the Tax-Calculator can be used in conjunction with the full IRS SOI PUF if the data 
has been purchased from the IRS. Therefore, this study uses the full 2009 IRS SOI PUF for the 
most accurate results possible given the data that is currently available. The underlying Tax-
Calculator computes federal individual income taxes and treasury revenues for tax filing years 
beginning with 2013. The Tax-Calculator code also is open source and is freely available (Tax 
Calculator). However, the calculator did not previously have the ability to estimate charitable 
giving. Upon request, changes were made to the Tax-Calculator code to estimate charitable 
giving in addition to treasury revenue and to estimate these outcomes at three different sets of 
elasticities. The full code for these changes and the analyses of the six different policy proposals 
is recorded online: Policy proposals  
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Appendix C: Tables 
 
Table C-1. Total giving under current law and six policy options (Seven policy scenarios run 
under three different sets of elasticities) 
 
Increased 
value of the 
Standard 
Deduction3 
Extension 
of 
Charitable 
Deduction 
Decrease in 
highest 
marginal tax 
rate to 35% 
Total 
contributions 
(billions of 
2017 dollars) 
Change in Total 
Contributions from 
Current-Law Level 
Billions 
of 
dollars Percent 
Current Law N/A N/A N/A $284.42 N/A N/A 
    Changes from Current Law 
Scenario 1 Yes No No    
Elasticity of -.5    $280.42 -$4.00 -1.41% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $276.43 -$7.99 -2.81% 
Variable Elasticity    $273.45 -$10.97 -3.86% 
Scenario 2 No Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $288.19 $3.77 1.33% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $291.96 $7.54 2.65% 
Variable Elasticity    $296.60 $12.18 4.28% 
Scenario 3 No No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $283.51 -$0.91 -0.32% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $282.61 -$1.81 -0.64% 
Variable Elasticity    $282.28 -$2.14 -0.75% 
Scenario 4 Yes No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $279.52 -$4.90 -1.72% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $274.63 -$9.79 -3.44% 
Variable Elasticity    $271.33 -$13.09 -4.60% 
Scenario 5 Yes Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $286.40 $1.98 0.70% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $288.39 $3.97 1.40% 
Variable Elasticity    $291.40 $6.98 2.45% 
Scenario 6 Yes Yes Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $285.49 $1.07 0.38% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $286.57 $2.15 0.76% 
Variable Elasticity    $289.25 $4.83 1.70% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 $11,000 for individuals; $22,000 for joint filers 
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Table C-2. Giving by itemizers under current law and six policy options (Seven policy scenarios 
run under three different sets of elasticities) 
 
Increased 
value of the 
Standard 
Deduction4 
Extension 
of 
Charitable 
Deduction 
Decrease in 
highest 
marginal tax 
rate to 35% 
Contributions 
by Itemizers 
(billions of 
2017 dollars) 
Change in 
Contributions by 
Itemizers from 
Current-Law Level 
Billions 
of 
dollars Percent 
Current Law N/A N/A N/A $209.67 N/A N/A 
    Changes from Current Law 
Scenario 1 Yes No No    
Elasticity of -.5    $205.90 -$3.77 -1.33% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $202.14 -$7.53 -2.65% 
Variable Elasticity    $199.32 -$10.35 -3.64% 
Scenario 2 No Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $209.46 -$0.21 -0.07% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $209.25 -$0.42 -0.15% 
Variable Elasticity    $209.09 -$0.58 -0.20% 
Scenario 3 No No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $208.77 -$0.90 -0.32% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $207.86 -$1.81 -0.64% 
Variable Elasticity    $207.53 -$2.14 -0.75% 
Scenario 4 Yes No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $205.01 -$4.66 -1.64% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $200.34 -$9.33 -3.28% 
Variable Elasticity    $197.20 -$12.47 -4.38% 
Scenario 5 Yes Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $208.20 -$1.47 -0.52% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $206.72 -$2.95 -1.04% 
Variable Elasticity    $205.79 -$3.88 -1.36% 
Scenario 6 Yes Yes Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $207.29 -$2.38 -0.84% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $204.91 -$4.76 -1.67% 
Variable Elasticity    $203.65 -$6.02 -2.12% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 $11,000 for individuals; $22,000 for joint filers 
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Table C-3. Giving by non-itemizers under current law and six policy options (Seven policy 
scenarios run under three different sets of elasticities) 
 
Increased 
value of the 
Standard 
Deduction5 
Extension 
of 
Charitable 
Deduction 
Decrease in 
highest 
marginal tax 
rate to 35% 
Contributions 
by Non-
Itemizers 
(billions of 
2017 dollars) 
Change in 
Contributions by 
Non-Itemizers 
from Current-Law 
Level 
Billions 
of 
dollars Percent 
Current Law N/A N/A N/A $74.75 N/A N/A 
    Changes from Current Law 
Scenario 1 Yes No No    
Elasticity of -.5    $74.52 -$0.23 -0.08% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $74.29 -$0.46 -0.16% 
Variable Elasticity    $74.13 -$0.62 -0.22% 
Scenario 2 No Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $78.72 $3.97 1.40% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $82.71 $7.96 2.80% 
Variable Elasticity    $87.51 $12.76 4.49% 
Scenario 3 No No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $74.75 $0.00 0.00% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $74.75 $0.00 0.00% 
Variable Elasticity    $74.75 $0.00 0.00% 
Scenario 4 Yes No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $74.52 -$0.23 -0.08% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $74.29 -$0.46 -0.16% 
Variable Elasticity    $74.13 -$0.62 -0.22% 
Scenario 5 Yes Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $78.21 $3.46 1.22% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $81.67 $6.92 2.43% 
Variable Elasticity    $85.61 $10.86 3.82% 
Scenario 6 Yes Yes Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $78.20 $3.45 1.21% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $81.65 $6.90 2.43% 
Variable Elasticity    $85.60 $10.85 3.81% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 $11,000 for individuals; $22,000 for joint filers 
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Table C-4. Total revenue under current law and six policy options (Seven policy scenarios run 
under three different sets of elasticities) 
 
Increased 
value of the 
Standard 
Deduction6 
Extension 
of 
Charitable 
Deduction 
Decrease in 
highest 
marginal tax 
rate to 35% 
Total Revenue 
(billions of 
2017 dollars) 
Change in Total 
Revenue from 
Current-Law Level 
Billions of 
dollars Percent 
Current Law N/A N/A N/A $2,793.03 N/A N/A 
    Changes from Current Law 
Scenario 1 Yes No No    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,728.81 -$64.22 -22.58% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,728.81 -$64.22 -22.58% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,728.81 -$64.22 -22.58% 
Scenario 2 No Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,781.45 -$11.58 -4.07% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,780.67 -$12.36 -4.35% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,779.89 -$13.14 -4.62% 
Scenario 3 No No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,768.54 -$24.49 -8.61% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,768.85 -$24.18 -8.50% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,768.96 -$24.07 -8.46% 
Scenario 4 Yes No Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,704.37 -$88.66 -31.17% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,704.67 -$88.36 -31.07% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,704.78 -$88.25 -31.03% 
Scenario 5 Yes Yes No    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,711.88 -$81.15 -28.53% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,711.35 -$81.68 -28.72% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,710.78 -$82.25 -28.92% 
Scenario 6 Yes Yes Yes    
Elasticity of -.5    $2,687.56 -$105.47 -37.08% 
Elasticity of -1.0    $2,687.34 -$105.69 -37.16% 
Variable Elasticity    $2,686.89 -$106.14 -37.32% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 $11,000 for individuals; $22,000 for joint filers 
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Table C-5. Number of itemizers and non-itemizers under current law and six policy options 
 
Itemizers Non-Itemizers 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Baseline 45.29   125.13   
Scenario 1 29.41 -15.88 -35.06% 141.01 15.88 12.69% 
Scenario 2 40.35 -4.94 -10.91% 130.07 4.94 3.95% 
Scenario 3 45.29 0 0% 125.13 0 0% 
Scenario 4 29.41 -15.88 -35.06% 141.01 15.88 12.69% 
Scenario 5 24.92 -20.37 -44.98% 145.50 20.37 16.28% 
Scenario 6 24.92 -20.37 -44.98% 145.50 20.37 16.28% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 
2017. 
 
 
 
Table C-6. Number of itemizers and non-itemizers under current law and six policy options, AGI 
<$50,000 
 
Itemizers Non-Itemizers 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Baseline 7.45   100.64   
Scenario 1 3.57 -3.88 -52.08% 104.52 3.88 3.86% 
Scenario 2 6.20 -1.25 -16.78% 101.89 1.25 1.24% 
Scenario 3 7.45 0 0% 100.64 0 0% 
Scenario 4 3.57 -3.88 -52.08% 104.52 3.88 3.86% 
Scenario 5 2.79 -4.66 -62.55% 105.30 4.66 4.63% 
Scenario 6 2.79 -4.66 -62.55% 105.30 4.66 4.63% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 
2017. 
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Table C-7. Number of itemizers and non-itemizers under current law and six policy options, AGI 
$50,000-$99,999 
 
Itemizers Non-Itemizers 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Baseline 13.99   18.41   
Scenario 1 8.11 -5.88 -42.03% 24.29 5.88 31.94% 
Scenario 2 11.87 -2.12 -15.15% 20.53 2.12 11.52% 
Scenario 3 13.99 0 0% 18.41 0 0% 
Scenario 4 8.11 -5.88 -42.03% 24.29 5.88 31.94% 
Scenario 5 6.43 -7.56 -54.04% 25.97 7.56 41.06% 
Scenario 6 6.43 -7.56 -54.04% 25.97 7.56 41.06% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 
2017. 
 
 
 
Table C-8. Number of itemizers and non-itemizers under current law and six policy options, AGI 
$100,000+ 
 
Itemizers Non-Itemizers 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) 
Change from Current 
Law Level 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Number 
(millions) Percent 
Baseline 23.85   6.08   
Scenario 1 17.73 -6.12 -25.66% 12.20 6.12 100.66% 
Scenario 2 22.29 -1.56 -6.54% 7.64 1.56 25.66% 
Scenario 3 23.85 0 0.00% 6.08 0 0.00% 
Scenario 4 17.73 -6.12 -25.66% 12.19 6.11 100.49% 
Scenario 5 15.70 -8.15 -34.17% 14.23 8.15 134.05% 
Scenario 6 15.71 -8.14 -34.13% 14.23 8.15 134.05% 
Source: The simulation results use the IRS Public-Use File for 2009 to project forward for 
2017. 
 
 
 
Table C-9. Percentage of sample by itemization status and AGI in PSID 
 Non-itemizers Itemizers Full Sample 
AGI <$50,000 73.5% 26.7% 54.4% 
AGI $50,000-$99,999 21.3% 39.7% 33.6% 
AGI $100,000+ 5.3% 33.6% 16.8% 
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Table C-10. Percentage of sample by itemization status and AGI in ISR PUF 
 Non-itemizers Itemizers Full Sample 
AGI <$50,000 80.4% (100.64M) 16.4% (7.45M) 63.6% (108.09M) 
AGI $50,000-$99,999 14.7% (18.41M) 30.9% (13.99M) 19.1% (32.4M) 
AGI $100,000+ 4.9% (6.08M) 51.4% (23.29M) 17.3% (29.37M) 
Full sample 73.7% (125.13M) 26.3% (44.73M) 169.86M 
 
 
Table C-11. Average giving by itemization status and AGI 
 Non-itemizers 
(PSID) 
Non-itemizers 
(IRS PUF) 
Itemizers 
(IRS PUF) 
Full Sample 
(IRS PUF) 
AGI <$50,000 $342.96 $453.42 $1,732.02 $541.54 
AGI $50,000-$99,999 $857.90 $965.05 $2,681.69 $1,706.28 
AGI $100,000+ $1,585.56 $1,866.37 $6,677.15 $5,699.88 
Full Sample $479.54 $597.35 $4,629.51 $1,668.91 
 
 
 
Figure C-1. Percentage changes from baseline in total giving under six policy scenarios, by 
income group (Variable elasticity) 
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Figure C-2. Percentage changes from baseline in total giving under six policy scenarios, by 
income group (Elasticity=-1.0) 
 
 
Figure C-3. Percentage changes from baseline in total giving under six policy scenarios, by 
income group (Elasticity=-.5) 
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Figure C-4. Total Charitable contributions by individual donors, 1975 to 2015 
 
Source: Giving USA 2016: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the year 2015 (Giving USA 
Foundation, 2016) 
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Appendix D: Microsimulation Outputs 
 
Baseline 
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of  
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving:  
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving  
Non-Itemizers 
$0-50K 7.45 100.64 206210.44 58535.34 12903.53 45631.81 541.54 1732.02 453.42 
$50K-100K 13.99 18.41 477849.84 55283.41 37516.91 17766.51 1706.28 2681.69 965.05 
$100K+ 23.85 6.08 2108967.48 170597.52 159249.97 11347.55 5699.88 6677.15 1866.37 
All 45.29 125.13 2793027.75 284416.28 209670.41 74745.87 1668.91 4629.51 597.35 
 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 58186.17 12569.1 45617.07 538.31 3520.76 436.44 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 54004.03 36318.07 17685.96 1666.79 4478.18 728.12 
$100K+ 17.73 12.2 2091078.69 168231.83 157016.19 11215.64 5620.84 8855.96 919.31 
All 29.41 141.01 2728805.43 280422.02 205903.35 74518.68 1645.48 7001.13 528.46 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 57837.06 12234.73 45602.33 535.08 3427.10 436.30 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 52724.9 35119.46 17605.44 1627.31 4330.39 724.80 
$100K+ 17.73 12.2 2091078.69 165866.61 154782.85 11083.76 5541.82 8730.00 908.50 
All 29.41 141.01 2728805.43 276428.57 202137.04 74291.53 1622.04 6873.07 526.85 
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Variable Elasticity    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 56973.82 11407.94 45565.88 527.10 3195.50 435.95 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 51470.85 33944.36 17526.49 1588.61 4185.49 721.55 
$100K+ 17.73 12.2 2091078.69 165005.02 153969.3 11035.72 5513.03 8684.11 904.57 
All 29.41 141.01 2728805.43 273449.7 199321.6 74128.09 1604.56 6777.34 525.69 
 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 6.2 101.89 203486.26 59631.14 12871.63 46759.51 551.68 2076.07 458.92 
$50K-100K 11.87 20.53 473426.92 56838.38 37485.75 19352.62 1754.27 3158.02 942.65 
$100K+ 22.29 7.64 2104540.29 171718.92 159103.88 12615.04 5737.35 7137.90 1651.18 
All 40.35 130.07 2781453.47 288188.44 209461.26 78727.18 1691.05 5191.11 605.27 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 6.2 101.89 203339.06 60726.71 12839.73 47886.98 561.82 2070.92 469.99 
$50K-100K 11.87 20.53 473108.46 58393.03 37454.61 20938.42 1802.25 3155.40 1019.89 
$100K+ 22.29 7.64 2104226.46 172840.1 158957.82 13882.28 5774.81 7131.35 1817.05 
All 40.35 130.07 2780673.97 291959.84 209252.16 82707.69 1713.18 5185.93 635.87 
          
Variable Elasticity    
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 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 6.2 101.89 202977.64 63435.74 12760.86 50674.88 586.88 2058.20 497.35 
$50K-100K 11.87 20.53 472798.57 59917.2 37424.07 22493.13 1849.30 3152.83 1095.62 
$100K+ 22.29 7.64 2104116.83 173248.52 158904.62 14343.9 5788.46 7128.96 1877.47 
All 40.35 130.07 2779893.04 296601.46 209089.54 87511.91 1740.41 5181.90 672.81 
 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 7.45 100.64 206210.44 58535.34 12903.53 45631.81 541.54 1732.02 453.42 
$50K-100K 13.99 18.41 477849.84 55283.41 37516.91 17766.51 1706.28 2681.69 965.05 
$100K+ 23.85 6.08 2084483.73 169693.46 158345.83 11347.63 5669.68 6639.24 1866.39 
All 45.29 125.13 2768544.01 283512.22 208766.27 74745.95 1663.61 4609.54 597.35 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 7.45 100.64 206210.44 58535.34 12903.53 45631.81 541.54 1732.02 453.42 
$50K-100K 13.99 18.41 477849.84 55283.41 37516.91 17766.51 1706.28 2681.69 965.05 
$100K+ 23.85 6.08 2084787.32 168789.59 157441.87 11347.72 5639.48 6601.34 1866.40 
All 45.29 125.13 2768847.6 282608.35 207862.31 74746.04 1658.31 4589.59 597.35 
          
Variable Elasticity    
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 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 7.45 100.64 206210.44 58535.34 12903.53 45631.81 541.54 1732.02 453.42 
$50K-100K 13.99 18.41 477849.84 55283.41 37516.91 17766.51 1706.28 2681.69 965.05 
$100K+ 23.85 6.08 2084897.78 168460.33 157112.58 11347.75 5628.48 6587.53 1866.41 
All 45.29 125.13 2768958.06 282279.09 207533.02 74746.07 1656.37 4582.31 597.35 
 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 58186.17 12569.1 45617.07 538.31 3520.76 436.44 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 54004.03 36318.07 17685.96 1666.79 4478.18 728.12 
$100K+ 17.74 12.19 2066646.04 167334.66 156118.87 11215.8 5590.87 8800.39 920.08 
All 29.41 141 2704372.78 279524.86 205006.03 74518.83 1640.31 6970.62 528.50 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 57837.06 12234.73 45602.33 535.08 3427.10 436.30 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 52724.9 35119.46 17605.44 1627.31 4330.39 724.80 
$100K+ 17.74 12.19 2066947.48 164072.46 152988.39 11084.07 5481.87 8623.92 909.28 
All 29.41 141.01 2704674.22 274634.42 200342.58 74291.83 1611.52 6812.06 526.86 
          
Variable Elasticity    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
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$0-50K 3.57 104.52 184714.26 56973.82 11407.94 45565.88 527.10 3195.50 435.95 
$50K-100K 8.11 24.29 453012.48 51470.85 33944.36 17526.49 1588.61 4185.49 721.55 
$100K+ 17.74 12.19 2067057.13 162884.12 151848.04 11036.08 5442.17 8559.64 905.34 
All 29.41 141.01 2704783.87 271328.8 197200.34 74128.45 1592.12 6705.21 525.70 
 
 
Scenario 5 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 182216.23 59228.81 12768.88 46459.93 547.96 4576.66 441.21 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446558.06 56628.55 37337.4 19291.14 1747.79 5806.75 742.82 
$100K+ 15.7 14.23 2083103.27 170544.04 158088.79 12455.24 5698.10 10069.35 875.28 
All 24.92 145.5 2711877.55 286401.39 208195.07 78206.32 1680.56 8354.54 537.50 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 182111.63 59922.13 12634.25 47287.88 554.37 4528.41 449.08 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446276.29 57973.41 37157.93 20815.48 1789.30 5778.84 801.52 
$100K+ 15.7 14.23 2082957.3 170490.56 156927.85 13562.72 5696.31 9995.40 953.11 
All 24.92 145.5 2711345.23 288386.11 206720.03 81666.08 1692.21 8295.35 561.28 
          
Variable Elasticity    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 181856.94 61636.52 12301.36 49335.15 570.23 4409.09 468.52 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446002.06 59291.91 36981.98 22309.93 1830.00 5751.47 859.07 
Tax Policy and Charitable Giving            52 
  
 
 
© 2017 The Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. All rights reserved. 
$100K+ 15.7 14.23 2082922.06 170471.09 156504.95 13966.14 5695.66 9968.47 981.46 
All 24.92 145.5 2710781.06 291399.51 205788.29 85611.22 1709.89 8257.96 588.39 
 
Scenario 6 
 
Elasticity -.5    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 182216.23 59228.81 12768.88 46459.93 547.96 4576.66 441.21 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446558.06 56628.55 37337.4 19291.14 1747.79 5806.75 742.82 
$100K+ 15.71 14.23 2058790.36 169633.93 157184.27 12449.67 5665.80 10005.36 874.89 
All 24.92 145.5 2687564.65 285491.29 207290.55 78200.74 1675.22 8318.24 537.46 
          
Elasticity -1    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 182111.63 59922.13 12634.25 47287.88 554.37 4528.41 449.08 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446276.29 57973.41 37157.93 20815.48 1789.30 5778.84 801.52 
$100K+ 15.71 14.23 2058954.19 168670.54 155118.98 13551.56 5633.62 9873.90 952.32 
All 24.92 145.5 2687342.12 286566.08 204911.17 81654.92 1681.53 8222.76 561.20 
          
Variable Elasticity    
 Number of 
Itemizers (m) 
Number of 
Non-Itemizers 
(m) 
Revenue ($m) Total Giving ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Itemizers ($m) 
Total Giving: 
Non-Itemizers 
($m) 
Average Total 
Giving 
Average 
Giving 
Itemizers 
Average 
Giving Non-
Itemizers 
$0-50K 2.79 105.3 181856.94 61636.52 12301.36 49335.15 570.23 4409.09 468.52 
$50K-100K 6.43 25.97 446002.06 59291.91 36981.98 22309.93 1830.00 5751.47 859.07 
$100K+ 15.71 14.23 2059031.43 168319.6 154366.65 13952.95 5621.90 9826.01 980.53 
All 24.92 145.5 2686890.43 289248.03 203650 85598.03 1697.27 8172.15 588.30 
 
